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STATE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
W. Kelly Woods*
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this Forum is "Government, Helping or Hurting?"
As far as nuclear power development is concerned, the answer is yes
and no. In the first place, the record of the nuclear power industry is
absolutely remarkable in that, with all of the experience we have had to
date, there has never been a single person injured by radioactivity at-
tributed to operation of a nuclear power plant. The industry can be
proud of this, but I am satisfied that the only reason it has come about
has been because of the outstanding regulation by the federal govern-
ment.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION
The federal government, by helping or making industry acquire
these kind of safety standards, has undeniably helped nuclear develop-
ment. On the other hand, the federal government has had sole respon-
sibility for determining the ultimate disposition of radioactive wastes.
For one reason or another, the federal government has been grossly
delinquent in solving this problem, and this delinquency is severely
hurting the industry. The State of California is on the verge of having
a nuclear moratorium until this problem is solved. There is growing
pressure in other states for a similar development. This is why I say
that yes, the federal government has helped, but they have also hurt.
If I leave the federal government and turn to the state government,
I have to admit that to date, the role of the state government in regulat-
ing nuclear power has been sufficiently minor that you cannot make
* Former Coordinator, Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council, State of Oregon, B.S., Stan-
ford University, Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1940; Fellow of the American Nu-
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any generalization as to whether it has been a help or hurt. On the
other hand, the state governments are gaining in their regulatory re-
sponsibility, and I think it will only be a matter of a few years before
we can address whether or not state governments are helping or hurt-
ing.
I would like to review the role of the state government in siting
and to review the history of the developments. Ten years ago, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) took the position that their only
goal in the siting of power plants was to look at the radiological
hazards and consequences. Early in the 1970s, the AEC issued a con-
struction permit for two nuclear power plants at a site called Calvert
Cliffs, in Maryland, on the Chesapeake Bay. Intervenors went to court
and alleged that this was a major federal action and that there had been
inadequate review of the federal action under the terms of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 The intervenors won.' The dis-
trict court ruled that the AEC, in siting plants, had to make their own
separate and independent review under NEPA, and that this could not
be delegated.3 In the meantime, the states for years have been doing
environmental review of housing, subdivisions, pulp and paper mills,
and coal-fired power plants that are not on federal land, and there was
no reason in the states' minds why they could not conduct the nonradi-
ological review of nuclear power plants. The states, for instance, in the
Northwest, felt that it was just irrational for somebody in Washington,
D.C. to try to tell the Northwest whether or not they needed another
power plant. I am sure that people in other parts of the country felt that
it was wrong for the federal bureaucrats in Washington to be trying to
assess the environmental impact of a plant in their state, when they felt
that they could do it more competently than these out-of-state people
could. So, about half the states, about twenty-five, now have some
kind of a siting procedure within the state.
Then we ran into this rather ridiculous situation where the state
was holding their hearings, the AEC was holding their hearings, the
same witnesses came before both hearings, and about the same infor-
mation, except in a variety of different forms, had to be submitted to
both groups. As this developed, pressure grew to get some kind of
legislation which would overrule the Calvert Cliffs decision. One of
the big developments occurred when the AEC was divided into the En-
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
2. Calvert Cliffs Coordination Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3. Id
1978]
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ergy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The new commissioners in the
NRC established a policy that they were trying to enhance state input
into the process, and they have been working aggressively and actively
with the National Governors Association. The most recent develop-
ment is the fact that we now have a former state governor in the White
House and at the end of February, 1978 the Carter Administration for-
mally told the National Governors Association that their policy was
going to be to maximize state input and minimize federal input in the
siting process.
I am not going to get into a discussion of this proposed Adminis-
tration bill.4 It has been oscillating back and forth. After it does go to
Congress, there will be hearings on it, and how much it will change
before it gets out of Congress I do not know. I am very optimistic that
this session of Congress will enact some kind of amendments to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954,1 which will no longer warrant the Calvert
Cliffs decision (requiring the NRC has to make its own independent
assessment) and that under the amendment, NEPA evaluations can be
done by interested and qualified states.
It is absolutely unreasonable that states which have participated in
the decision as to whether or not a plant is needed and if needed, where
it should be located, should then turn its head the other way and feign
no further interest in that plant. There has been very little discussion
at all on the role of the states after plants have been sited.
III. SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
First, in the field of construction of sited plants, although the states
have a role in the ancillary facilities, this has to continue to be a federal
responsibility. The NRC can afford to develop specialists in the differ-
ent construction disciplines, instrumentation, mechanical, concrete, and
move those people from one site to another as the construction sched-
ule warrants. These people moving from one site to another know
what problems have occurred in construction, and they can be sensitive
to the possibility of problems in your state. On the other hand, the
states are not content to learn only as much as the federal government
happens to be willing to tell them. When a federal inspector goes into
a plant, before he leaves he has what is called an exit interview, where
he sits down with management and reports what was good, what was
4. H.R. 11704, S. 2775, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970) (repealed 1974).
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bad. He gives management a chance to comment, and to attempt to
refute any charges. The NRC has been very cooperative with the
states in arranging for a state representative to be invited to sit in on
these exist interviews.
Now this has very great advantages for the states. First of all, the
states have a rapport with the people that does not exist between the
people and the federal government. The state can report to their citi-
zens on the quality of the construction as a result of these exit inter-
views. They know how often inspections were made, what was
inspected, and what was found. On the other hand, there are certain
restraints that have to be instituted to make this system work. Initially,
the state has to have a single agency that is concerned. We cannot let
the federal government get into jurisdictional disputes between state
agencies. Secondly, the state must send people to these exit interviews
who are knowledgeable and who can comprehend what they are hear-
ing. The whole thing will break down if you try to send a stenotypist to
just take notes. Third, the state representative must not use these exit
interviews for his personal education. His participation must be con-
structive. If he does not understand what is going on, he had better
learn that at times other than when these federal inspectors are there.
Finally, because there have been instances, it is essential that the state
representative refrain from any subsequent personal aggrandizement in
his relations with the news media.
The siting of nuclear power plants and the construction of nuclear
power plants are transient phenomena, for once the power plant is in
place, it will be there for forty-odd years. It is incumbent on the states
to acquire a cadre of knowledgeable, experienced people, who can,
down through the years, follow what is going on at this nuclear power
plant. I would like to go back in history a little bit, and note that several
years ago, in the siting process, the State of Minnesota tried to impose
on the Northern States Power Company, restrictions on how much ra-
dioactivity could be released, restrictions which were just a small per-
cent of what the AEC had been allowing. It went all the way up to the
Supreme Court, and the court rulings were that the intent of Congress
was that the federal government had preempted the states for regulat-
ing the operation of nuclear power plants, and that in particular, the
setting of radioactivity release limits was part of the regulating of the
operation.6 I believe it is because of this preemption problem that so
6. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (1970), a f'd, 447 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1971), a.f'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
1978]
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little consideration has been given to the role of the states over an oper-
ating plant. It is an unwarranted conclusion. It was a narrow decision
on the part of the Supreme Court, and even though certain portions of
the regulatory process have been preempted, there still remains a sub-
stantial amount of responsibility that the states can and should assume
over operating plants.
If the state has indeed participated in the environmental review for
the proposed plant, of course they have come up with environmental
specifications. It is then the state's responsibility, or should be, to
monitor compliance with these environmental technical specifications,
and if necessary, to enforce compliance. I will go a step further. Even
though the federal government establishes limits on how much radioac-
tive material can be released, it does not violate the preemption concept
for the federal government to delegate to the states who are personally
and immediately concerned responsibility for monitoring compliance
with those federal standards.
In Oregon we have done one thing which has not been done any-
where else in the nation. We have taken several meters in the control
room of a nuclear power plant, meters which read the concentration of
radioactivity in certain affluent streams. The readings on these meters
are being transmitted by telemetry one hundred miles down to Salem,
Oregon, into the state police offices, which are manned around the
clock. We have a continuous twenty-four hour reading of the concen-
tration of radio-activity in these effluent streams. Sure we are doing
some monitoring. The only events we have encountered other than
false readings were occasional instances where the utility did not do
adequate dillution before discharge. Our main reason for wanting to
put these in was so that in the event of an accident, we would know
promptly that something had gone wrong out there, without being de-
pendent on the utility to remember to tell us.
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
It is the responsibility of the state to develop, implement and test
radiologically emergency response plans. This is done in several
states. I can speak from experience in Oregon. We have a simulated
accident. We are out on the highway, and we stop cars and hand out a
flyer saying we are going through a drill. If this had been for real, we
would have asked you to turn around and go back. We take simulated
victims by ambulance down to the hospital, and assure ourselves that
despite external contamination, that the hospital does have facilities
[Vol. 13:782
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that can receive contaminated injuries. One of the most important
things we found out early in the game is that you cannot expect the
radiological health physicist to communicate with others by putting
dimes in a filling station pay phone. We now have an adequate supply
of radio telephones so that we can communicate with one another in
the field. This is a state responsibility.
Mentioning a couple of other things, it is important, I believe, for
the state to participate in the review and approval of the security plans,
the plans for deterring terrorists. In order to do this, you have to have
statutory authority to keep that kind of review exempt from any public
meeting law or any public information law. We do not like to have
classified material around our office, and the solution has been just to
rent a safety deposit box in a nearby bank.
Another role of the state is in fire protection. The operator of a
nuclear power plant does not have enough firemen around. He is de-
pendent upon nearby fire districts. By bringing the state in early we
show up problems associated with what do we have to go through to
get the firemen cleared so that he can get through the security fence and
fight the fire. Or what is necessary if we want to go through another
security fence in order to pull water out of the river in order to aid in
fire fighting. These things can be addressed most effectively at the lo-
cal level by the states.
I will mention lastly that the state has an important role in public
information, just as it did in construction. We have found that it is very
helpful if the state can bring pressure on the utility to make sure that
incidents which require outages are publicized promptly. This not
only helps educate the public, but it avoids the situation as has been
encountered where we get a lot of wild rumors floating around that are
difficult to squelch.
My last comment is that the state can play a role in the regulation
of sited nuclear power plants only if a progressive legislature has
passed enabling legislation with proper consideration of adequate
financing for this kind of effort.
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